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Abstract
We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary’s advice
when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers’ and consumers’
payoffs can be congruent or conflicting, and show that this has important implications
for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive
to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-off than under no
bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility and bias harms consumers.
We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their efficacy also
depends on whether the payoffs exhibit congruence or conflict.
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1 Introduction
Consumers often turn to an intermediary for advice when choosing among firms. The
intermediary’s job is to provide information about which are the best products and which
products best fit each consumer’s needs. However, the intermediary does not necessarily
have the consumer’s best interests in mind. Particular concerns have repeatedly been
raised about the fact that a vertically integrated intermediary has a clear incentive to
bias its advice in favour of its own product offerings rather than those of rivals. These
concerns have given rise to high-profile investigations in many markets by regulators and
competition authorities, who worry about potentially harmful effects of bias.
For example, in the current debate about platform regulation a major issue is that of
“own-content bias”, i.e. when a multi-sided platform that is also present on one side of the
market behaves in such a way as to steer consumers towards its own products or services.
Google, for instance, has been investigated in many jurisdictions for promoting its own
products in search results.1 In 2017 the European Commission imposed a e2.42bn fine
after Google was found guilty of favoring its own comparison shopping website. Before
that, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the High Court of England and Wales
had ruled against fining Google for related practices.2 Other companies may soon face
similar charges: the European Commission recently launched an investigation to determine
whether Amazon uses its dominant position in the e-commerce market to favor its own,
private-label sellers.3 Some of Apple’s practices also tend to favor its own services at
the expense of competitors (see Kra¨mer and Schnurr, 2018, for a thorough discussion).
The European Commission, particularly active when it comes to the issue of platform
regulation, recently put forward a proposal to require platforms to, among other things,
be transparent regarding “how they treat their own goods or services compared to those
1Edelman and Lai (2013) provide evidence that Google’s own-content bias drives more traffic to its
affiliate flight-search service than it would get otherwise.
2See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39740
for the EC’s decison, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/
statement-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.
pdf for the FTC’s one, and http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2016/253.html for the High
Court’s decision in Streetmap.EU Ltd v Google Inc. & Ors (2016); all pages accessed 12 October 2018.
3See https://www.ft.com/content/a8c78888-bc0f-11e8-8274-55b72926558f, accessed 12 Octo-
ber 2018.
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offered by their professional users”.4 This issue may become more prevalent in the not-too-
distant future with the growth of the market for virtual assistants, currently dominated
by vertically integrated firms like Amazon, Google, and Apple. Forbes already reports
that “Eighty-five percent of Amazon customers select the recommended Amazon product
when voice shopping”.5
The mechanisms of own-content bias may also apply to situations where a leading
application or hardware provider (the “intermediary”) chooses one of its own comple-
mentary applications as the default option for consumers: Safari as the default browser
for iPhones, Google as the default search engine for its browser Chrome, etc. Being the
default option is a powerful way to foster usage of a product or service, as the default bias
is well-documented (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Companies sometimes choose long-term
contracts as an alternative to integration: For example, the technology press reports that
heavy bidding forced Google to pay $300 million for the right to be the default search
engine in Mozilla Firefox and $1 billion for similar rights across Apple’s suite of products.6
The idea that an intermediary might provide biased recommendations because of
financial incentives is, of course, not restricted to the digital economy. Similar concerns
have been raised in the pharmaceutical and financial industries, where doctors and
financial advisers sometimes receive commissions potentially leading them to recommend
one treatment/investment over another which would be better suited to their patient/client
(Engelberg, Parsons, and Tefft, 2013; Cookson et al., 2017; Egan, 2017). Default option
bias may also apply there, as when a bank offers its own insurance alongside a loan.
Biased intermediation raises two main concerns: First, are consumers directed towards
inferior or higher priced products or services? Second, does bias distort firms’ incentives
in a way that harms consumers? Even though these concerns are common to the situa-
tions described above, a certain degree of heterogeneity remains as to the institutional
4A summary of the proposal is available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3372_
en.htm, accessed 12 October 2018.
5See https://www.forbes.com/sites/kirimasters/2018/06/30/amazon-voice-commerce-a-
huge-opportunity-for-brands-or-too-early-to-tell/#2080f0a83d43, accessed 16 October 2018.
6See http://allthingsd.com/20111222/google-will-pay-mozilla-almost-300m-per-year-in-
search-deal-besting-microsoft-and-yahoo/ and https://www.recode.net/2014/4/16/11625704/
marissa-mayers-secret-plan-to-get-apple-to-dump-google-and-default-to, accessed 12 Octo-
ber 2018.
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or strategic environments. A key concern in the price comparison website industry, for
example, has been the effect of paid endorsements on final consumer prices. Search engines
and websites, by contrast, are mostly free to access so that attention in the search bias
debate has focused on innovation and investment decisions rather than on pricing. It is
therefore doubtful that the analysis of a particular market could be transposed directly to
another one. We show that, in order to understand the effects of bias, it is often possible to
reduce complex strategic heterogeneity to a simpler problem of identifying the relationship
between firms’ and consumers’ marginal payoffs. This insight allows us to nest a variety of
strategic environments and study how they drive both the consequences of bias and the
efficacy of various policy interventions.
More concretely, we consider a market composed of two sellers, a unit mass of consumers,
and one intermediary. Sellers are differentiated, and at least some of the consumers cannot
observe the sellers’ characteristics and offers. This creates a role for the intermediary,
whose technology allows it to identify the best match for each consumer. However, the
intermediary is integrated with one of the sellers and therefore has incentives to produce
biased recommendations, i.e., to recommend its own seller more often that would be
objectively justified. We measure the extent of bias as the share of uninformed consumers
who are wrongly directed towards the integrated seller.
In order to accommodate the strategic heterogeneity mentioned above, we abstract
from the details of firm’s product design choices and use a modelling framework where
sellers make two decisions: (i) the level of utility they offer to consumers, and (ii) their
per-unit mark-up. This framework, which encompasses the Armstrong and Vickers (2001)
competition-in-utility model, allows us to nest a variety of strategic environments: pure
price competition; quality competition among free, ad-funded products; competition in
price and quality; competitive investments in cost-reducing technology; and others.
Within this model, we introduce the notions of conflict and congruence between a
seller’s and its customers’ payoffs. Conflict arises when the most efficient way for a seller to
increase the utility offered to consumers is to reduce its per-unit mark-up (as in standard
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price competition, where such a reduction corresponds to a price decrease). Congruence, on
the other hand, arises when higher utility levels are also associated with higher mark-ups.
This is the case, for instance, when quality is the most important dimension for competition
(in a sense made precise below).
Our main contribution is to show that the notions of congruence and conflict are critical
in determining (i) the effect of bias on competition between sellers, (ii) the implications
for consumer surplus, and (iii) the efficacy of various policy interventions.
Intuitively, in our model, bias acts as a demand-shifter by increasing the number of
consumers directed to the integrated seller and by reducing the demand for its competitor.
This provides an incentive for the integrated seller to select a strategy yielding a higher
per-unit mark-up—corresponding to a higher utility under congruence, and to a lower
utility under conflict. The opposite effects are at play for the non-integrated seller.
In terms of consumer surplus, bias is always harmful under conflict: consumers are
mis-matched more often, and the favored seller offers a lower utility than its rival. Under
congruence, on the other hand, bias is sometimes good for consumers because it provides
the favored seller with stronger incentives to offer higher levels of utility, which may
offset the mis-match costs. Thus, suppose a regulator is considering reducing bias (e.g.,
by imposing a fiduciary duty on the intermediary). Such an intervention will generally
improve consumer outcomes under conflict, but may not do so under congruence. Besides
the effects of direct regulation of bias, we study several other policy interventions that
have been mooted in recent bias cases: neutrality (forcing the intermediary to grant equal
prominence to the two sellers), transparency policies that alert consumers to the presence
of bias, and the break-up (or divestiture) of the integrated firm. The neutrality policy is
always ineffective, whereas the efficacy of the other interventions extends only to situations
of conflict. Thus, whether the environment exhibits congruence or conflict not only drives
the effects of bias, but also influences the range of effective tools available to policy makers.
As part of our analysis of transparency, we endogenize the intermediary’s choice of the
level of bias and find that bias tends to be higher under congruence than conflict.
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Related literature
This article contributes to the literature on information intermediaries. Several recent
articles study intermediaries whose role is to help consumers choose among products,
and focus on how commissions or other contracts affect both the quality of the rec-
ommendation and sellers’ behavior. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) study the effects of
mandatory disclosure of commissions, whereas Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b) focus on
the intermediary’s equilibrium compensation structure and associated policies. In Teh
and Wright (2018) firms pay commissions to influence the intermediary’s advice and pass
the cost on to consumers; but the intermediary is unbiased in equilibrium because firms
offer symmetric commissions. De Cornie`re and Taylor (2014) and Burguet, Caminal, and
Ellman (2015) study the determinants of search engine bias and its effect on websites’
strategies. Armstrong and Zhou (2011) look at several models where firms can become
prominent, one of which involves the payment of commissions to an intermediary. These
articles only consider environments with, using our terminology, conflicting payoffs. An
important contribution of our work is to consider a richer strategic environment in which
payoffs may be congruent rather than conflicting. Indeed, we will see that congruence
arises endogenously from fairly natural models of competition. Moreover, we show that
both the implications of bias and the efficacy of various policy responses are quite different
depending on whether the environment is one of congruence or conflict.
A related literature studies certification intermediaries, whose role is to disclose to
consumers the quality of the products that are offered. In contrast with the articles
mentioned above and with ours, this literature has mostly abstracted away from competition
between sellers.7 In the absence of commitment power by the intermediary,8 an important
concern is the threat of collusion between the intermediary and the firms it is supposed to
certify. Several articles examine the role of reputational incentives as a disciplining device
for the intermediary (Biglaiser, 1993; Strausz, 2005; Peyrache and Quesada, 2011; Durbin
and Iyer, 2009). Rather than studying conditions under which collusion can or cannot
7An exception is Buehler and Schuett (2014).
8See Lizzeri (1999) and Albano and Lizzeri (2001) for models with perfect commitment power,
respectively with exogenous and endogenous quality.
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occur when qualities are exogenous, we study the effects of collusion (“bias” in our model)
on the equilibrium behavior of firms (e.g., choice of quality and price).9
Some articles cover related themes in the context of intermediation in online markets.
One aspect of the net neutrality debate concerns agreements between Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) and Content Providers (CPs) whereby some CPs can ensure preferential
treatment for themselves by paying the ISP (a “fast lane access”). Choi and Kim (2010)
and Economides and Hermalin (2012), for instance, study how such agreements affect the
ISP’s incentives to invest. In contrast to this, we focus on sellers’ investment incentives.10
Another series of articles study the effect of news aggregators on competition among
content providers (Dellarocas, Katona, and Rand, 2013; Jeon and Nasr, 2016; Rutt, 2011).
News aggregators help consumers identify quality content, and the above articles study
how their presence affects content providers’ incentives to invest in quality. Unlike the
present article, this literature has not investigated cases where the intermediary is biased
towards a subset of content providers.
A closely related literature is that on the tying of complementary products (e.g.,
Whinston, 1990; Nalebuff, 2004; Carlton and Waldman, 2002; Carbajo, De Meza, and
Seidmann, 1990; Chen, 1997). In particular, Choi (2004) considers how tying may affect
both the pricing and the incentives to invest in quality for the tied product. Some of our
results are reminiscent of his (in particular that bundling has a positive effect on the tied
product’s quality and a negative one on the rival’s product). However, his focus is quite
different from ours, as he is mostly interested in the profitability of bundling in a setup
with strategic substitutes whereas we emphasize the importance of the congruence/conflict
dichotomy and consider a wider set of policy interventions.
9Biglaiser and Friedman (1994) deal with reputational incentives in a setup with endogenous qualities.
10A few articles look at downstream investment, but from a different perspective to that taken here.
Choi and Kim (2010) assume that such investments do not benefit consumers, unlike in our setup. Choi,
Jeon, and Kim (2015) and Peitz and Schu¨tt (2016) study investments that have externalities for other
sellers (to reflect the issue of congestion, which is an important technical aspect of the net neutrality
debate), which is not a feature of our environment.
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2 The model
The market we consider is composed of two sellers (i ∈ {1, 2}), a unit mass of consumers,
and one intermediary that is integrated with seller 1.
Competition between sellers: the (u, r)-model
In modelling competition between sellers, our objective is to have a parsimonious framework
that still allows us to capture a variety of strategic environments beyond simple price
competition. To do so, we follow Armstrong and Vickers (2001) by assuming that sellers
compete in utilities. More precisely, suppose that seller i can design an offer that generates
a base level of utility ui to its customers. Suppose that the associated demand function is
Di(u1, u2), increasing in ui and decreasing in uj (we adopt a Hotelling specification for
demand, as described in the next subsection).
In general, a base level of utility ui is achieved through various instruments (price,
quality, number of advertisements displayed alongside content, etc.). However these
instruments are not equivalent. Increasing quality may require a seller to pay larger
fixed costs,11 whereas the “cost” of lowering the price consists in a lower mark-up, and is
thus mostly borne on a per-consumer basis.12 To allow for a discussion of these various
instruments, we write profits as a function of both the utility offered and the per-consumer
mark-up, ri. The combination of ui and ri generates a fixed cost C(ui, ri). This cost is
such that ∂
2C
∂u2
≥ 0, ∂2C
∂r2
≥ 0, and ∂2C
∂u∂r
≥ 0.13 Seller i’s profit is therefore
pii(ri, ui, uj) = riDi(u1, u2)− C(ui, ri). (1)
For a given uj, we assume throughout the article that pii is concave.
Let us discuss some examples of environments that can be subsumed into the (u, r)
framework. These fall into two categories: two-dimensional cases where sellers choose both
11For example, when the product in question is a website’s content, the costs of improving quality
(hiring more and better writers, substituting original for syndicated content, etc.) are almost entirely
fixed.
12Some quality improvements may only entail higher marginal costs (e.g. if they consist in using higher
quality inputs), in which case they are formally closer to a price reduction.
13In most of our applications, the cost is a function of ui + ri.
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u and r; and one-dimensional cases where sellers choose (only) u, with r(u) determined as
a function of that choice.
Two dimensions: Price and quality competition with a fixed cost The most
straightforward application of the (u, r)-framework is a situation where sellers have control
over a price pi and a quality qi. If the cost of quality is K(qi), sellers’ marginal cost is γ,
and if utility is ui = qi − pi, we can write ri = pi − γ and C(ui, ri) = K(ui + ri + γ). The
seller’s problem is then transformed into maxui,ri pii(ri, ui, uj), as in (1).
A very similar logic would apply if sellers could choose a price and invest in a reduction
of marginal cost.
Two dimensions: A seller with three decision variables This (u, r)-framework
may also be applied to some situations where sellers’ vector of decisions is of dimension
larger than 2. For instance, suppose that sellers simultaneously choose a price pi, a quality
qi and a cost-reduction level ∆i so that the marginal cost is γ − ∆i (the cost of this
investment is G(∆i), with G
′′ > 0).
We then have ui = qi − pi and ri = pi − γ + ∆i. We can write profit as riDi(u1, u2)−
K(ui + pi) − G(ri − pi + γ). For a given (ui, ri), let p(ui, ri) be the value of pi that
minimizes K(ui + pi) +G(ri − pi + γ) (a convex function of pi). We can write C(ui, ri) ≡
K(ui + p(ui, ri)) + G(ri − p(ui, ri) + γ), so that seller i’s problem can be written in the
form maxui,ri pii(ri, ui, uj).
One dimension: Pure pricing and pure quality models In other setups, sellers
may not have the ability to choose both ri and ui, due to a lack of available instruments.
For instance, if sellers’ only available strategic tool is their price then ui and ri are
simultaneously determined by the price level:14 ri = pi and ui = v− pi (v is the exogenous
willingness to pay). The cost associated to any level of utility is C(ui, r(ui)) = 0, which
corresponds to the model of Armstrong and Vickers (2001). In this case, we can write
ri = v − ui ≡ r(ui), and the seller’s profit is simply a function of ui: pii = ri(ui)Di(u1, u2).
14Here we normalize the marginal cost to 0.
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For another uni-dimensional example, suppose that 1 and 2 are websites whose revenues
solely come from advertising. They can invest K(qi) in the quality qi of their content,
which simultaneously determines the utility ui = u(qi) that consumers get, and advertisers’
willingness to pay to be displayed to a consumer alongside the content, ri = r(qi).
Given u′(qi) > 0, we can think of the seller as choosing ui, resulting in quality q(ui) =
u−1(ui) and revenue r(q(ui)). Again, we can write the seller’s problem as maxui pii =
maxui{r(q(ui))Di(u1, u2)−K(q(ui))}.
One dimension: Price-quality competition with per-unit quality costs Another
possibility is that sellers choose price and quality, (pi, qi), but with K(qi) being a marginal
rather than fixed cost. We then have ui = qi− pi and ri = pi−K(qi). The seller’s problem
can be reformulated as maxui ri(ui)Di(u1, u2), where ri(ui) = maxqi{qi − ui −K(qi)} is
the most profitable way of providing ui. Thus, the problem reduces to the one-dimensional
case where the seller chooses only ui.
Demand side: preferences, information, and intermediation
We adopt the Hotelling formulation to model demand:15 sellers are located at the ends of
a unit length segment, over which consumers are uniformly distributed. The utility that
a consumer derives from consumption of product i is ui − tdi, where di is the distance
separating the consumer from seller i and t is the differentiation parameter. A consumer’s
utility is maximized by choosing seller 1 if his location, x, satisfies x < x∗ ≡ 1
2
+ u1−u2
2t
,
and seller 2 if x > x∗.16 A fraction 1 − µ of consumers are “informed” and choose the
seller that maximizes their utility. The remaining µ consumers are “uninformed” and rely
on the intermediary to help them choose a seller.
The intermediary observes both sellers’ offers and each consumer’s location. One
interpretation is that consumers submit a precise query to the intermediary, which can
15In an earlier version of this article we found similar results in a model without horizontal differentiation.
In Appendix B we show that the main result holds with various alternative discrete choice demand
specifications.
16Throughout the article we focus on cases where the market is covered, and ignore the possibility of
large deviations that result in the market being uncovered.
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then infer how suited to the consumers’ needs the two products are. The intermediary
then provides advice to the consumer.
The intermediary is integrated with seller 1. Therefore, although it has the ability to
match each consumer to their best option it does not necessarily have the incentive to do so.
Indeed, everything else equal, the intermediary would want to direct as many consumers
as possible towards seller 1. Thus, the intermediary biases its recommendation to steer
consumers who are close to indifferent towards the integrated seller (for example, by
featuring seller 1 more prominently or exaggerating seller 1’s advantages). More formally,
we assume that the intermediary is able to steer uninformed consumers with x < x∗ + b to
seller 1, leaving only those with x > x∗ + b to choose seller 2 (see Figure 1).17 Thus, b is a
measure of the intermediary’s ability to influence consumers through bias. We endogenize
the level of bias, b, in section 4.
The total demands (from informed and uninformed consumers) are therefore given by
D1(u1, u2, b) =
(
1
2
+
u1 − u2
2t
)
+ µb, (2)
D2(u1, u2, b) =
(
1
2
+
u2 − u1
2t
)
− µb. (3)
We solve for the (Nash) equilibrium choices of u and r by the sellers.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
Conflict and congruence
We can decompose a seller’s problem into two parts. The first step is to identify the
value of ri, denoted rˆi(ui, uj, b), that would accompany a given choice of ui. In one-
dimensional cases such as pure price or pure quality competition, we exogenously have
17Formally, it is as though the intermediary were able to increase consumers’ perceived value of seller 1
by 2tb. Indeed, we can write
x∗ + b =
u˜1 − u2 + t
2t
,
where u˜1 = u1 + 2tb is consumers’ perceived value of good 1. This would lend bias a similar interpretation
to persuasive advertising a` la Dixit and Norman (1978).
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rˆi(ui, uj, b) = r(ui). When the seller can choose both ui and ri, on the other hand,
rˆi(ui, uj, b) is endogenously chosen as the most profitable way to provide a target level of
utility. The first-order condition giving rˆi, namely
∂pii(ri,ui,uj ,b)
∂ri
= 0, is then
Di(u1, u2, b) =
∂C(ui, rˆi(ui, uj, b))
∂ri
. (4)
The optimal way to provide a utility level ui depends on uj, through its effect on demand.
For example, if firm i faces a choice between reducing its price or increasing its quality, the
former option is more attractive when there are fewer consumers, i.e. when uj is larger.
Given rˆi, i’s decision is reduced to a one-dimensional problem of choosing ui to maximize
pii(rˆi(ui, u
∗
j , b), ui, u
∗
j), where u
∗
j is the expected equilibrium play of j.
We now introduce the notions of conflict and congruence, which will play a key role in
our analysis.
Definition 1. For a given uj , we say that seller i’s and its customers’ payoffs are conflicting
if
∂rˆi(ui,uj ,b)
∂ui
< 0. They are congruent if
∂rˆi(ui,uj ,b)
∂ui
> 0.
In the uni-dimensional case, congruence or conflict is an intrinsic property determined
entirely by the (exogenous) sign of r′(u). When sellers choose both u and r, on the other
hand, congruence or conflict arise endogenously as a strategic consequence of firms’ product
design decisions. Whether payoffs are congruent or conflicting then depends on the sign of
the cross-derivative ∂
2pii
∂ri∂ui
: there is congruence if it is positive, and conflict otherwise.
Notice that the definitions of conflict and congruence apply to the mark-up rˆi, not
to the entire profit pii. In other words, congruence does not imply that seller i’s profit
increases as it offers a higher level of utility.
Most previous work has focused on environments that exhibit conflict. The possibility
of congruence has received much less attention, despite the fact that it emerges quite
naturally in plausible models of competition. Let us apply Definition 1 to some of the
examples discussed above:
Price and quality model with fixed costs Suppose sellers choose a price and a
quality, with positive fixed cost and marginal cost normalized to zero. We saw above that
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pii(ri, ui, uj) = riDi(u1, u2, b)− C(ui + ri). We therefore have
congruence ⇐⇒ ∂
2pii(ri, ui, uj)
∂ri∂ui
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∂Di(u1, u2, b)
∂ui
− C ′′(ui + ri) > 0.
Payoffs are more likely to be congruent when demand is more sensitive to the utility
offered, and when the cost of providing quality is not too convex. Intuitively, if seller i
finds it optimal to increase utility mostly by reducing its price then payoffs are conflicting.
If, on the other hand, it finds it optimal to increase both its quality and, to a smaller
extent, its price, then payoffs are congruent.
An example to which we will return is the price-quality model where costs are
quadratic:18
ui = v + qi − pi, ri = pi, fixed cost K(qi) = C
2
q2i =
C
2
(ui + ri − v)2. (5)
From (5), qi = ui − v + ri so we can substitute qi out of the profit expression. Solving
the resulting first-order condition ∂pii
∂ri
= 0 yields rˆi. The optimal (p, q) to provide a given
utility is then:
pi(ui, uj, b) ≡ rˆi(ui, uj, b) = 1− 2Ct
2Ct
ui +
[
v +
2tbµ+ t− uj
2Ct
]
, (6)
qi(ui, uj, b) ≡ ui + pi(ui, uj, b)− v = t+ ui − uj + 2btµ
2Ct
.
From (6), we have congruence if Ct < 1/2 and conflict if Ct > 1/2. Notice that the intensity
of competition, as measured by the parameter t (a lower t meaning that competition is
more intense), determines whether payoffs are congruent or conflicting: intense competition
goes hand in hand with congruent payoffs. To see why, notice first that the cost of provided
a higher utility is either fixed if this is achieved through an increase in quality, or variable
if achieved through a lower price. When t is small, demand increases a lot following an
increase in ui, which leads firm i to prefer to use a mix of higher quality and not-so-higher
18We abuse notation by using C to denote the constant cost parameter in this example. Parameter v,
which may equal zero, is the value of the product when a firm does not invest.
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price (i.e., congruence) rather than to use a decrease in the price.
Pure price and pure quality competition models In the one-dimensional model,
congruence or conflict is given by the sign of r′(ui). In the model where sellers only
compete in prices (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001), we have ri ≡ pi = v − ui, so r′(ui) < 0.
In words: payoffs are conflicting.
In the model where websites compete purely in content quality, there is congruence
if r′(ui) > 0. This is true if u′(qi) and r′(qi) have the same sign—that is, if advertisers
are willing to pay more to be exposed alongside content of higher quality, a reasonable
assumption in practice.
An example parameterization that accommodates both the pure price and pure quality
cases is
r(ui) = v − ψui, fixed cost C(ui) = C
2
u2i , (7)
which yields conflict if ψ > 0 and congruence when ψ < 0.
Price and quality competition with per-unit cost Suppose sellers choose price and
quality, with the cost of quality provision incurred on a per-unit basis. We saw in Section
2 that r(ui) = maxqi{qi − ui −K(qi)}. This is decreasing in ui, so the market is one with
conflict.
Equilibrium effects of bias
Recall that x∗ is the location of the consumer who is indifferent between firms 1 and 2.
Suppose that b is small enough that x∗ + b ≤ 1 in equilibrium. Demands are given by (2)
and (3).
Define Πi(ui, uj, b) ≡ pii(rˆi(ui, uj, b), ui, uj, b) as the profit evaluated at the optimal ri,
and let uˆi(uj) ≡ argmaxuiΠi(ui, uj, b) be seller i’s best-response to the utility provided by
seller j. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Stability). For i = 1, 2, |uˆ′i(uj)| < 1.
14
Assumption 1 ensures that the equilibrium, which is such that uˆi(u
∗
j) = u
∗
i , is stable.
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For example, Assumption 1 requires Ct > 1/3 in the price-quality specification of (5), or
Ct > −3ψ/2 in the one-dimensional specification given in (7).
To obtain the equilibrium effect of bias on u1 and u2, one needs to take into account
both the direct and the strategic effects: bias affects the best-response function of each
seller (direct effect), but also what seller i expects seller j to play (strategic effect). In other
words, we must consider both the shift in sellers’ reaction functions, and their slopes. The
next Lemma, which we obtain by totally differentiating the first-order condition ∂Πi
∂ui
= 0,
characterizes these effects. Omitted proofs are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Consider the best-response functions uˆi(uj).
(i) An increase in b causes uˆ1 to shift up when 1’s payoffs are congruent, and to shift
down when 1’s payoffs are conflicting.
(ii) An increase in b causes uˆ2 to shift down when 2’s payoffs are congruent, and to
shift up when 2’s payoffs are conflicting.
(iii) u1 and u2 are strategic substitutes when payoffs are congruent, and strategic
complements when payoffs are conflicting.
The intuition for the direct effect in parts (i) and (ii) is the following: an increase in
bias b means that seller 1 faces relatively more inframarginal, or “captive”, consumers, and
that seller 2 faces relatively fewer of them. The incentive to choose a higher per-consumer
revenue ri is therefore increased for seller 1, and decreased for seller 2. Under congruence,
a higher r1 corresponds to a higher u1, and a lower r2 to a lower u2. The reverse holds
under conflict.
Notice that an increase in b can be interpreted both as a decrease in seller 1’s demand
elasticity (thereby suggesting a higher price) and as an increase in its scale (usually
associated with higher quality). Whether payoffs are congruent or conflicting determines
which of these two forces dominates.
Regarding the issue of strategic substitutability or complementarity, the intuition is
19Assumption 1 is a sufficient condition for stability. The necessary condition is that |uˆ′1(u2)||uˆ′2(u1)| < 1.
However, if Assumption 1 was violated, the equilibrium would have the implausible property that
dD1(u
∗
1 ,u
∗
2 ,b)
db < 0 when payoffs are conflicting.
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more subtle. Suppose that payoffs are congruent. The marginal effect on pii of an increase
in seller j’s offer is rˆi
∂Di
∂uj
. In the Hotelling model, the term ∂Di
∂uj
is independent of ui (see
below for a discussion). Therefore, under congruence, the impact of a rise in uj is more
important for high values of ui (which correspond to high values of rˆi). This means that
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
< 0, i.e. uˆi(uj) is decreasing. The reverse is true under conflict.
Given Lemma 1, we can represent the equilibrium effect of bias graphically. Figure 2
corresponds to the case of congruence. There, the direct and strategic effects go in the
same direction: more bias leads u1 to go up and u2 to go down (direct effect). By strategic
substitutability, the increase in u1 is reinforced by the decrease in u2, and reciprocally.
The overall effect is therefore clear: bias leads u1 to increase, and u2 to decrease.
In the case of conflicting payoffs, things are less clear a priori (see Figure 3). If the
direct effect implies that u1 goes down whereas u2 goes up, strategic complementarity
goes in the opposite direction. We show in Proposition 1 that, under our assumptions, the
direct effect always dominates.
Proposition 1. Let u∗i (b) be the equilibrium utility offered by seller i.
1. If seller 1’s payoffs are congruent then u∗′1 (b) > 0; if 1’s payoffs are conflicting then
u∗′1 (b) < 0.
2. If seller 2’s payoffs are congruent then u∗′2 (b) < 0; if 2’s payoffs are conflicting then
u∗′2 (b) > 0.
Proposition 1 implies that when both sellers’ payoffs are conflicting (e.g., when prices
are the most important dimension for competition), we have u1 < u2. When sellers’ payoffs
are congruent the opposite is true: u1 > u2. In both cases, |u1 − u2| increases in b.
Welfare analysis
In order to obtain results about the effects of the policies on consumer surplus and
welfare, we restrict attention to the one-dimensional and the two-dimensional setups with
quadratic costs, described in (7) and (5) respectively. Recall that we have conflict in the
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one-dimensional case when ψ > 0, and in the two dimensional case when Ct > 1/2 (and
congruence otherwise).
As a preliminary result, the following Proposition describes the equilibrium in both
the one- and two-dimensional cases.
Proposition 2. In the two-dimension case (where payoffs are given by (5)), if the level
of bias is b, we have :
u∗1 = v +
(1− 2Ct)(1− Ct(2bµ+ 3))
2C(1− 3Ct) , u
∗
2 = v +
(1− 2Ct)(1− Ct(3− 2bµ))
2C(1− 3Ct) . (8)
In the one-dimension case (where payoffs are given by (7)), if the level of bias is b, we
have:
u∗1 =
2Ct2 + v
2Ct+ ψ
− t− 2btµψ
2Ct+ 3ψ
, u∗2 =
2Ct2 + v
2Ct+ ψ
− t+ 2btµψ
2Ct+ 3ψ
. (9)
Consumer surplus is then
CS = (1− µ)
{∫ x∗
0
[u∗1 − tx] dx+
∫ 1
x∗
[u∗2 − t(1− x)] dx
}
+
µ
{∫ x∗+b
0
[u∗1 − tx] dx+
∫ 1
x∗+b
[u∗2 − t(1− x)] dx
}
. (10)
Comparative statics on b lead to the following:
Proposition 3. There exists values CtS and CtW (given in the proof) such that:
1. Under conflict, consumer surplus always decreases as b increases. Under congruence,
consumer surplus is increasing in b if Ct < CtS, decreasing otherwise.
2. Total welfare increases in b if Ct < CtW , and decreases otherwise.
3. Industry profit is always increasing in b, so that CtS ≤ CtW .
The one-dimensional model has the advantage that the existence of congruence/conflict
is determined solely by ψ, independent of the model’s demand and cost parameters. It
therefore allows us to study in isolation the effect of conflict and congruence. We find that
the two regimes have quite different implications for consumer surplus, with bias being
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unambiguously harmful under conflict but not under congruence. The same pattern is
repeated for the two-dimensional case.
Under congruence, bias causes seller 1 to endogenously increase its utility offer in
response to a larger captive audience. Thus, more consumers are steered towards a better
seller as the level of bias increases. This gain from improved investment must be weighed
against the preference mis-matching implied by bias. If Ct is not too large then the positive
effects of bias dominate because (i) low transport costs mean that the mismatching is not
very harmful, and (ii) low C amplifies the increase in seller 1’s investment in its product.
Under conflict, an increase in bias results in more consumers being directed to a seller
at the same time as that seller’s utility offer becomes endogenously worse. Combined with
the mismatching implied by bias, this must leave consumers worse-off in aggregate.
Regarding industry profit, an increase in b moves the situation nearer to a monopoly
one, and therefore increases total profit (even though firm 2 is worse-off). This implies
that, even if firm 2 could offer side payments to the integrated intermediary, this would not
be enough to deter it from offering biased results to consumers. Given that industry profit
increases with bias, total welfare is more likely than consumer surplus to also increase
with b, which explains that CtS < CtW .
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 3.
Discussion
Robustness to alternative model specifications Our baseline model makes two
functional form assumptions: consumer preferences are taken to be a` la Hotelling, and
bias is taken to be additive. We begin by discussing the robustness of Proposition 1 to
these assumptions.
Firstly, the additive bias specification (D1 = x
∗ + µb, D2 = 1− x∗ − µb) reflects the
idea that bias—perhaps achieved by exaggerating seller 1’s qualities, making it prominent,
or otherwise giving it a slight advantage—is most likely to influence consumers who
were close to indifferent to begin with. An alternative specification would see consumers
affected by biased advice uniformly at random, yielding demand D1 = x
∗(1 − b) + b
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and D2 = (1 − x∗)(1 − b).20 The main practical difference is that an increase in b now
reduces the sensitivity of demand for both firms: ∂2Di/∂ui∂b < 0. This implies that seller
2’s best response function sometimes shifts down with bias under conflict and seller 1’s
best response sometimes decreases under congruence, which can make the sign of dui/db
ambiguous for one of the sellers. Nevertheless, a slightly weaker version of Proposition 1
continues to hold. Indeed, in Appendix B we prove that bias still induces u∗1 > u
∗
2 under
congruence and u∗2 > u
∗
1 under conflict, with the difference increasing in b.
Secondly, the Hotelling demand specification, x∗ = 1
2t
(t + u1 − u2), is such that
∂2Di/∂ui∂uj = 0. Under alternative demand specifications this cross derivative is non-
zero, with the consequence that congruence no longer implies strategic substitutability,
nor does conflict imply strategic complementarity.21 We study the robustness of our
model to such alternative demand specifications in Appendix B. There, we compute
the equilibrium for two popular discrete choice demand models (logit and probit), and
show that, in both cases, Proposition 1 continues to hold. In particular, even where the
correspondence between congruence/conflict and subsitutability/complementarity breaks
down, u∗1 increases with b under congruence and decreases under conflict (with u
∗
2 moving
in the opposite direction).
Lastly, in Appendix B we also study the case with both the alternative multiplicative
specification for bias and the alternative discrete choice demand specifications. Again, we
find that the basic message of the model is robust.22
A note on corner solutions Proposition 1 holds when x∗ + b ≤ 1, i.e. at an interior
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium seller 2 can attract additional uninformed consumers
20We take µ = 1 here for the sake of brevity.
21Taking the two-dimensional case as an example, the slope of the reaction functions has the same sign
as
∂rˆi
∂uj︸︷︷︸
<0
∂2pii
∂ui∂ri︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
+rˆi
∂2Di
∂ui∂uj
,
where term (a) is positive when payoffs are congruent and negative when they are conflicting.
22Another variation would be to stick with the Hotelling setup, but assume consumers are non-uniformly
located along the line. For example, if we let consumers’ location follow distribution Φ then demand for
firm 1 would be Φ(x∗ + b) (combining non-linearity with non-separability in bias). We also check our
results in this case (with Φ being truncated normal). Details are in the web appednix.
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by slightly increasing u2. If bias is very strong (b very large) then we would instead obtain
a corner solution in which seller 2 does not serve any of the uninformed consumers in a
neighbourhood around u∗2. A similar result to Proposition 1 obtains in this case.
Corollary 1. In a corner equilibrium u∗1 > u
∗
2 if payoffs are congruent, and u
∗
2 > u
∗
1 if
payoffs are conflicting.
In order to avoid having to deal with different regimes and streamline the exposition,
from now on we focus on cases where the solution is interior:
Assumption 2 (Interior Equilibrium). b ≤ b, where b satisfies 1
2
+
u∗1(b)−u∗2(b)
2t
+ b = 1.23
4 Policy analysis
The existence of bias in equilibrium is a priori problematic, as it means that at least
some consumers are misled by the intermediary. In this section we study several policy
interventions that have been contemplated or implemented in markets where biased
intermediation is a concern.
We consider several behavioral remedies (imposition of a fiduciary duty, neutrality
obligation, transparency regulation) as well as a structural one, namely the breaking-up of
the integrated firm, an intervention we refer to as divestiture.
In order to obtain clean results about the effects of the policies on consumer surplus,
we restrict attention to the two-dimensional model with quadratic costs, described in (5).
Recall that we have conflict when Ct > 1/2 (and congruence otherwise).
Regulating bias: fiduciary duty
The most natural intervention to consider is one where the intermediary would be required
to provide objective advice. Such a fiduciary duty is, for instance, commonly imposed on
financial advisers.
23A solution to this equation exists. In cases where there is more than one solution, we take the
smallest one.
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Formally, we model this policy as a requirement to lower the level of bias b. Ideally,
fiduciary duty would mean b = 0, but the policy may be difficult to implement because of
monitoring costs or imperfect compliance by the intermediary. The effects of this policy
can be obtained as a direct corollary to Proposition 3:
Corollary 2. Under conflict, imposing a fiduciary duty increases consumer surplus. Under
congruence, it increases consumer surplus if Ct > CtS, and reduces it otherwise.
This analysis implies that imposing a fiduciary duty on the intermediary benefits
consumers when payoffs are conflicting, but may be misguided under congruence when
the cost of providing utility C is small and when competition between sellers (as inversely
measured by t) is strong.
Neutrality
When the level of bias is not observable, or not verifiable by a court, the previous policy
may be difficult to implement. A crude way to approximate b = 0 without having to
construct a measure of bias is to force the intermediary to send fraction 1/2 of consumers
to seller 1. For instance, the intermediary might be required to recommend seller 1 and
2 equally often or otherwise extend equal treatment to the two sellers. We refer to this
kind of intervention as a neutrality policy. This kind of remedy was considered (though
ultimately dismissed) when, in 2016, the UK’s high court ruled on Streetmap.EU Ltd v
Google Inc. Specifically, Streetmap argued that Google should be required to randomize
the provider of the map shown to users who conduct a location-based query (instead of
always showing them a Google map). On one hand, the policy was mooted to provide
sellers with a level playing field and stimulate competition between them. On the other
hand, the court was concerned that neutrality requirements limit the intermediary’s ability
to favor sellers with very high quality products. Here we investigate the merits of these
claims.
Formally, we adapt the baseline model such that the intermediary is constrained to
send uninformed consumers with x ≤ 1/2 to seller 1, whereas the remainder are sent to
seller 2.
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Under neutrality, sellers’ profits are
pii = ri
[
(1− µ)
(
1
2
+
1
2t
(ui − uj)
)
+
µ
2
]
− C
2
(ui + ri − v)2. (11)
We observe two changes from the baseline model. Firstly, profits are symmetric. Thus,
sellers choose symmetric equilibrium strategies, u∗1 = u
∗
2, resulting in D1 = D2 = 1/2.
Because half of the consumers should go to each seller when they play symmetric strategies,
the intermediary ends up sending all consumers to their preferred alternative. In other
words, neutrality eliminates bias as intended. However, neutrality also affects competition
between sellers. Given that each seller has a guaranteed market share of 1/2 over the
uninformed consumers, sellers only compete to attract the informed ones. Indeed, under
neutrality we have ∂Di/∂ui = (1−µ)/2t, whereas in the baseline case ∂Di/∂ui = 1/2t. This
negative competition-softening effect dominates the no-bias result under both congruence
and conflict, leaving consumers worse-off overall.
Proposition 4. A neutrality policy
1. results in ex post optimal matching of consumers and sellers,
2. reduces the average utility offered by sellers (weighted by market share),
3. reduces overall consumer surplus.
Our analysis thus vindicates one of the main concerns about this policy raised in
the Streetmap v Google case. Neutrality is also subject to some practical concerns. An
industry may have many sellers and frequent entry by new sellers (some of whom are of
dubious quality). Policymakers must specify which of these sellers are eligible to benefit
from the neutrality policy. Thus, instead of the intermediary vetting sellers (a task in
which it is specialized), neutrality imposes this burden on the policy authority.
Transparency
In the baseline model we treat the level of bias as given and investigate its effect on sellers’
equilibrium choices. The underlying assumption is that uninformed consumers are unaware
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of the existence of bias or unable to do anything about it. This could be the case for
several reasons. Firstly, it might be that consumers na¨ıvely expect the intermediary to
act in their best interest (or are simply unaware of the bias). This frames bias in the
same intellectual tradition as persuasive advertising, which is taken to distort consumers’
perception of their own preferences without them noticing (see, e.g., Dixit and Norman,
1978).24 Secondly, it may be that the intermediary serves many different markets but
is integrated with a seller in just a few. For instance, even though Google is integrated
in a few markets (videos, maps, shopping, etc.), the majority of queries do not fall into
these categories. Therefore the “average” level of own-content bias is probably quite small,
which may lead consumers to follow the recommendation even if they know that it will be
biased in a few instances.25
In response to concerns that uninformed consumers might be vulnerable to deception,
policymakers often consider transparency policies that force intermediaries to disclose the
extent to which they are biased. Our assumption here is that such a disclosure would
make uninformed consumers aware of the existence (and magnitude) of bias, and lead
them to rationally choose whether to follow the intermediary’s recommendation.26 In turn,
given the new awareness of consumers, the policy could lead the intermediary to be less
biased towards its own affiliate.
To model the effect of a transparency policy, let us introduce some more structure
on consumers’ information. Informed consumers are perfectly informed and always go
directly to the seller offering them the highest utility. Uninformed consumers are unable
to observe the utilities offered by each firm. Additionally, although uninformed consumers
may know their own tastes, they do not know how those tastes map onto the available
products.27 In other words, they view their own position, x, on the Hotelling line as a
24In Footnote 17 we describe how bias in the Hotelling model can be formally framed in this light.
25This informal reasoning can be made rigorous. Below, when consumers observe b, we show that all
consumers will follow the intermediary’s recommendation for b sufficiently low. Thus, if a small fraction
of queries are subject to bias but consumers don’t know which ones (so that the expected level of bias
on each given query is positive but low) then consumers would follow the advice even if they are fully
rational.
26An alternative interpretation of this extension is as a reduced-form long-run model in which consumers
have become aware of bias via the intermediary’s reputation and choose whether to follow its advice or
not.
27Formally, this could be modelled as follows: each consumer has a type θ ∈ Θ that encapsulates his
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uniform draw from [0, 1]. As an illustrative example, a tourist might know their own
food preferences, but not know which restaurants in a town best cater to these tastes or
have the best food/prices. The intermediary, on the other hand, can observe the utilities
and determine each consumer’s x (e.g. via a matching algorithm), thereby being able to
identify the best match for each consumer.
We use the following timing: at τ = 1, the intermediary selects a level of bias b. At
τ = 2, sellers 1 and 2 observe b and choose their actions (ui, ri). At τ = 3, uninformed
consumers consult the intermediary, which recommends seller 1 to those located to the left
of t+u1−u2
2t
+b, and seller 2 to the others. At τ = 4, informed consumers select their preferred
seller, whereas uninformed consumers choose whether to follow the recommendation or buy
from the non-recommended seller.28 We consider two cases. In the post-transparency case,
uninformed consumers correctly observe the magnitude and direction of b, form correct
beliefs about the equilibrium uis that result, and rationally choose whether to follow the
intermediary’s advice or not. The pre-transparency case is the same, except we assume
that uninformed consumers form beliefs and behave at τ = 4 as if they had observed b = 0.
Thus, suppose the intermediary recommends firm 1 to a consumer who perceives a level
of bias bˆ ∈ {0, b} and expects firms to offer utility uei . Upon receiving the recommendation,
and using Bayes’ rule, the consumer believes that his position is x ∈ [0, xe + bˆ], where
xe =
t+ue1−ue2
2t
. The consumer finds it optimal to follow the intermediary’s advice if
∫ xe+bˆ
0
1
xe + bˆ
(ue1 − tx) dx ≥
∫ xe+bˆ
0
1
xe + bˆ
(ue2 − t(1− x)) dx. (12)
For any b ≥ 0, a consumer to whom the intermediary recommends firm 2 always wants
to follow the recommendation because firm 2 is never recommended to a consumer with
x < x∗.
Firms’ optimal choice of u depends on how many consumers they expect to follow the
intermediary’s recommendation, whereas consumers’ choice to follow the recommendation
or her preferences. Each taste, θ, corresponds to a location x = f(θ) on the Hotelling line. However,
uninformed consumers do not know the mapping f , they know only that the resulting x are uniform. The
intermediary, on the other hand, knows f(·) and can therefore determine each consumer’s x.
28Similar results would obtain if the consumers’ outside option were to forego the intermediary’s advice
altogether and choose a seller at random.
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depends on the us they expect firms to offer. Firms’ and consumers’ expectations should
be consistent in equilibrium, which can result in multiple equilibria. As a selection device,
we focus on equilibria in which uninformed consumers follow the recommendation when
such equilibria exist.
As a preliminary result, we verify that the intermediary would choose to increase bias as
much as possible if it could be sure that consumers will always follow the recommendation.29
Recall that we have defined b as the maximal level of bias, i.e. such that t+u1(b)−u2(b)
2t
+b = 1
(and its value is thus different under congruence and conflict).
Lemma 2. Suppose all uninformed consumers follow the intermediary’s recommendation.
For any b ≤ b, firm 1 benefits from an increase in b.
Given Lemma 2, we now investigate how biased the intermediary can be in equilibrium.
Prior to the transparency intervention, uninformed consumer behave as if b = 0 and thus
find it optimal to follow the intermediary’s advice ((12) is always satisfied for bˆ = 0). It is
immediate that the intermediary can increase b to b in this case and will choose to do so.
Now suppose that the intermediary is forced to publicly disclose b, resulting in bˆ = b.
We ask whether this affects its ability to influence consumer behavior with biased results.
Proposition 5. Prior to transparency, the intermediary is maximally biased: b∗ = b.
Under transparency:
1. When payoffs are congruent, there exists an equilibrium in which the intermediary is
maximally biased, b∗ = b.
2. When payoffs are conflicting, we must have positive but less than maximal bias,
0 < b∗ < b, in equilibrium.
The proof is instructive, so we include it here:
Proof. The pre-transparency case follows immdiately from Lemma 2.
29We should not take this for granted: bias causes seller 2 to become a tougher competitor under conflict
(u2 increases in b), which could conceivably leave the integrated firm worse off. Lemma 2 establishes that
this does not happen. The proof of the lemma holds for any convex cost function, not only the quadratic
case.
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Suppose that payoffs are congruent, and that b = b. If all consumers follow the
recommendation, we have u1(b) > u2(b) (Proposition 1). When b = b the recommendation
gives no information regarding the horizontal match (everybody is directed towards seller
1), so following the advice or going against it both yield the same distribution of transport
costs. Therefore, each consumer is better-off following the recommendation.
When payoffs are conflicting and b = b, we have u1(b) < u2(b). Given that the
recommendation is non-informative about the horizontal match, consumers would be
better-off going against the recommendation and each choosing seller 2. Thus we must
have b < b in equilibrium.
If b = 0, consumers strictly prefer following the intermediary: both sellers provide the
same level of utility ui(0), but the expected transportation cost is smaller if they follow
the (unbiased) recommendation. By continuity, for a small enough level of bias b =  > 0
consumers still prefer to follow the recommendation.
Discussion The congruence/conflict dichotomy plays a key role in determining the
efficacy of the transparency requirement. Under congruence, the requirement does not
prevent the intermediary from being maximally biased because bias leads seller 1 to offer
a higher utility than seller 2. When payoffs are conflicting, the intermediary cannot
be maximally biased because consumers would go against its advice. However, the
intermediary can still achieve a positive level of bias in equilibrium because, for small
levels of bias, the informativeness regarding the horizontal match outweighs the fact that
the favored seller is of lower intrinsic quality.
Transparency policies are frequently suggested or implemented as a solution to bias.
For example, in 2018 the European Commission issued new rules requiring “providers of
online intermediation services [to] formulate and publish general policies on [. . . ] how they
treat their own goods or services compared to those offered by their professional users”.30
Price comparison websites (PCWs) offer an interesting case in point. In this industry,
the presence of vertical integration (between PCWs and sellers)31 and of commissions
30See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3372_en.htm, accessed 12 October 2018.
31For instance, the insurance PCW Confused.com is part of the Admiral group, a motor insurance
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paid by sellers, often in return for favorable positioning, has led to regulatory scrutiny.
For instance, OfGem, the UK energy regulator, provides PCWs with an accreditation
provided they prominently list the energy companies from which they receive commission
on sales, as well as make it clear that they earn commission on certain tariffs.32 In France,
recent legislation33 requires PCWs across all sectors to be more transparent regarding
(i) the criteria they use to rank the offers they display, (ii) the existence of contracts (or
capitalistic links) with firms, and (iii) the final price paid by the consumer and other
“essential characteristics” of the offers. We argue that, in the context of PCWs, competition
is mostly in prices and the interests of sellers and of consumers are in conflict. Therefore we
view such interventions as likely to lead to less bias, lower prices, and increased consumer
surplus.
In other markets, our assessment of the benefits of transparency is more cautious.
For instance, there have been calls for Google to be more transparent over its ranking
algorithms, and in particular about the way results are biased to favor Google’s own
services. We argue that several of the markets in question are characterized by payoff
congruence: maps, browsers, and many other services are free and advertising-supported,
and competition is mostly on the quality dimension. Our model indicates that, in cases
where bias is harmful, transparency would do little to alleviate the issue.
Another interpretation of our results could be that transparency, even if it is sometimes
useless, does no harm, and that hence it should be encouraged. Here we would like to draw
attention to the fact that transparency has a specific meaning in our model, namely that
the intermediary reveals the extent of its bias to consumers. We do not say anything about
requiring intermediaries to fully disclose the inner workings of their algorithms, which
might reduce incentives to invest in algorithm design and leave the algorithms vulnerable
to manipulation.
company.
32See https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/information-consumers/domestic-consumers/switching-
your-energy-supplier/confidence-code, accessed 18 July 2016.
33https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/decret/2016/4/22/EINC1517258D/jo, accessed 18 July
2016.
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Divestiture
The three interventions discussed above represent behavioral remedies against bias and, as
such, would require some form of continued monitoring of the intermediary’s conduct to
have any effect. An alternative approach would consist in imposing structural remedies,
such as a separation of seller 1 and the intermediary. Such a policy was, for example,
proposed during the European Commission’s antitrust investigations against Google.34 The
Indian government recently proposed a regulation preventing e-commerce intermediaries
from selling products from companies they have an equity stake in,35 and Elizabeth Warren
made a similar proposal part of her platform for the 2020 U.S. presidential election.36 To
model divestiture, we assume that the intermediary is still able to sell its recommendation
to one of the two sellers, but that the contract can only be a short-term one, i.e. bargaining
occurs after sellers have chosen their actions (ui, ri).
37
If seller i is recommended, the number of consumer it serves is
t+ui−uj
2t
+ µb, versus
t+ui−uj
2t
− µb if seller j is recommended. It is therefore willing to pay up to 2µbri for the
recommendation.
In equilibrium, efficiency dictates that the intermediary should grant prominence to
the firm with the largest ri. The equilibrium price then depends on the specific bargaining
process. In a first-price auction, if we restrict attention to equilibria in undominated
strategies, firm i pays 2µbrj to the intermediary. If, on the other hand, the intermediary
has all the bargaining power,38 it can charge 2µbri. We allow for a range of outcomes in
between these two extreme cases by assuming that the intermediary has bargaining power
α ∈ [0, 1), resulting in a price 2µb (αri + (1− α)rj).
We start by describing the equilibrium of the game under divestiture. If the two sellers
choose the same value of r, each one is made prominent with probability 1/2. The profit
34See, e.g., https://www.ft.com/content/617568ea-71a1-11e4-9048-00144feabdc0, accessed 25
March 2019.
35https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/26/indias-tightens-e-commerce-rules-likely-to-hit-
amazon-flipkart.html
36https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c
37If bargaining occurred before the choice of u and r, the firms could write contracts that replicate
integration.
38If for instance it can make make sequential take it or leave it offers.
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of seller i is then
pii = ri
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(ui − uj)
]
− µbri − C
2
(ui + ri − v)2.
Even though the intermediary is always biased, the expected demand for seller i is the
same as if there was no bias. The second term is the expected payment to the intermediary:
with probability 1/2, seller i pays the intermediary 2µb(αri + (1− α)rj), with rj = ri.
If ri > rj, the profit of seller i is
pii = ri
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(ui − uj) + µb
]
− 2µb[αri + (1− α)rj]− C
2
(ui + ri − v)2, (13)
and the profit of seller j is
pij = rj
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(uj − ui)− µb
]
− C
2
(uj + rj − v)2. (14)
Lemma 3. Under divestiture, the equilibrium is asymmetric. One seller chooses a higher
ri than its rival, and is recommended by the intermediary with probability 1.
Even though divestiture puts sellers 1 and 2 in an ex ante symmetric situation by
breaking the contractual ties between seller 1 and the intermediary, the equilibrium is
necessarily asymmetric: one seller (say i) anticipates that it will be recommended and
chooses a high ri, whereas seller j anticipates that it will not be recommended and chooses a
low rj . However, this asymmetric equilibrium is not equivalent to the one under integration
because the intermediary can extract part of the value of seller i’s investment. Comparing
divestiture and integration, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6. Suppose the intermediary divests its interest in seller 1. Then,
1. under conflict, consumer surplus increases compared to integration;
2. under congruence, consumer surplus falls.
To understand the intuition, it is useful to compare the profit functions. Suppose
without loss of generality that firm 1 is the one choosing a high value of r in equilibrium.
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Seller 2’s profit function is the same under both integration and divestiture, therefore its
best-response uˆ2(u1) is unchanged. On the other hand seller 1’s profit function is not the
same under both regimes: under divestiture, it has to pay an amount 2µb(αr1+(1−α)r2) to
the intermediary. The marginal payoff from increasing r1 is thus lower. Under congruence,
this means that the payoff of choosing a higher u1 (and the associated rˆ1(u1, u2)) is also
lower: seller 1’s best-reply uˆ1(u2) shifts down. The reverse is true under conflict. Figure
5 then illustrates that both sellers end up providing higher utility levels under conflict
(which benefits consumers), whereas only seller 2 does so under congruence. In the latter
case, because seller 2 serves fewer consumers, consumer surplus goes down compared to
integration.
5 Conclusion
Because information intermediaries play an influential role in shaping consumers’ choices,
and because they often have a stake in the outcome of those choices, it is not surprising
that intermediaries have been accused of biasing their advice in response to economic
incentives. But information intermediaries exist in many different industries, where firms
employ many different business models. This presents a challenge for policy makers who
are asked to consider the effects of bias in a wide variety of strategic environments. To
what extent can lessons from one market context (e.g., search engine bias) be transferred
to another (e.g., paid promotion on price comparison websites)?
To cast light on this question, we introduce the notions of congruence and conflict,
and show that they play an important role in shaping the effects of bias and the efficacy
of various policy interventions. Environments exhibiting conflict are those where higher
revenues are obtained by extracting more surplus at consumers’ expense (for example,
when firms compete mostly in prices). In such an environment, intermediary bias leads
the favored firm to endogenously offer lower utility. Thus, consumers are systematically
mismatched in favour of a firm they like less, which tends to harm them. Although bias is
harmful, we find that a range of policy responses (direct regulation of bias, divestiture,
and transparency) are all at least somewhat effective at improving consumer outcomes.
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We contrast this case with environments exhibiting congruence. Congruence arises
when strategies that increase firms’ per-consumer revenues also increase consumers’ utility
(such as when firms improve the quality of their product and share the resulting surplus
with consumers). Here, an increase in bias leads the beneficiary firm to invest in improving
its utility offer. Thus, although bias implies that some consumers are still systematically
mismatched, the mismatching now happens in favor of an endogenously better product.
This softens the effects of bias for consumers and, indeed, means that an increase in bias can
leave consumers better-off overall. Although bias can be less problematic under conditions
of congruence, any problems that do arise are likely to be more difficult to deal with. This
is because the same factors that allow bias to be beneficial (in particular, the favored
firm’s enhanced investment incentive) tend to make policy interventions less effective
under congruence than conflict. Divestiture, neutrality, and transparency interventions
fail entirely to improve consumer outcomes, with only direct imposition of a fiduciary duty
remaining effective.
References
Albano, Gian Luigi and Alessandro Lizzeri (2001). “Strategic certification and provision
of quality”. International Economic Review 42.1, pp. 267–283.
Armstrong, Mark and John Vickers (2001). “Competitive price discrimination”. RAND
Journal of Economics, pp. 579–605.
Armstrong, Mark and Jidong Zhou (2011). “Paying for Prominence”. Economic Journal
121.556, F368–F395.
Biglaiser, Gary (1993). “Middlemen as Experts”. RAND Journal of Economics 24.2,
pp. 212–223.
Biglaiser, Gary and James W Friedman (1994). “Middlemen as guarantors of quality”.
International Journal of Industrial Organization 12.4, pp. 509–531.
Buehler, Benno and Florian Schuett (2014). “Certification and minimum quality standards
when some consumers are uninformed”. European Economic Review 70, pp. 493–511.
31
Burguet, Roberto, Ramon Caminal, and Matthew Ellman (2015). “In Google we trust?”
International Journal of Industrial Organization 39, pp. 44 –55. issn: 0167-7187.
doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.003. url: http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016771871500017X.
Carbajo, Jose, David De Meza, and Daniel J Seidmann (1990). “A strategic motivation
for commodity bundling”. The Journal of Industrial Economics 38.3, pp. 283–298.
Carlton, Dennis W and Michael Waldman (2002). “The strategic use of tying to preserve
and create market power in evolving industries”. RAND Journal of Economics 33.2,
pp. 194–220.
Chen, Yongmin (1997). “Equilibrium product bundling”. Journal of Business 70.1, pp. 85–
103.
Choi, Jay Pil (2004). “Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements”.
Economic Journal 114, pp. 83–101.
Choi, Jay Pil, Doh-Shin Jeon, and Byung-Cheol Kim (2015). “Net Neutrality, Network
Capacity, and Innovation at the Edges”. Working Paper.
Choi, Jay Pil and Byung-Cheol Kim (2010). “Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives”.
RAND Journal of Economics 41.3, pp. 446–471.
Cookson, Gordon, Tim Jenkinson, Howard Jones, and Jose Vicente Martinez (2017). “Best
Buys and Own Brands: Investment Platforms Recommendations of Mutual Funds”.
Working Paper.
De Cornie`re, Alexandre and Greg Taylor (2014). “Integration and Search Engine Bias”.
RAND Journal of Economics 45.3, pp. 576–597.
Dellarocas, Chrysanthos, Zsolt Katona, and William Rand (2013). “Media, Aggrega-
tors, and the Link Economy: Strategic Hyperlink Formation in Content Networks”.
Management Science 59.10, pp. 2360–2379.
Dixit, Avinash and Victor Norman (1978). “Advertising and Welfare”. The Bell Journal
of Economics 9.1, pp. 1–17.
Durbin, Erik and Ganesh Iyer (2009). “Corruptible advice”. American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics 1.2, pp. 220–242.
32
Economides, Nicholas and Benjamin E Hermalin (2012). “The economics of network
neutrality”. The RAND Journal of Economics 43.4, pp. 602–629.
Edelman, Benjamin and Zhenyu Lai (2013). “Exclusive Preferential Placement as Search
Diversion: Evidence from Flight Search”. Working Paper.
Egan, Mark (2017). “Brokers vs. Retail Investors: Conflicting Interests and Dominated
Products”. Working Paper.
Engelberg, Joseph, Christopher A. Parsons, and Nathan Tefft (2013). “First, Do No Harm:
Financial Conflicts in Medicine”. Working Paper.
Inderst, Roman and Marco Ottaviani (2012a). “Competition Through Commissions and
Kickbacks”. American Economic Review 102.2, pp. 780–809.
— (2012b). “How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protection”.
Journal of Financial Economics 105.2, pp. 393–411.
Jeon, Doh-Shin and Nikrooz Nasr (2016). “News Aggregators and Competition among
Newspapers in the Internet”. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8.4, pp. 91–
114.
Kra¨mer, Jan and Daniel Schnurr (2018). “Is there a need for platform neutrality regulation
in the EU?” Telecommunications Policy.
Lizzeri, Alessandro (1999). “Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries”.
RAND Journal of Economics 30.2, pp. 214–231.
Nalebuff, Barry (2004). “Bundling as an Entry Barrier”. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 119.1, pp. 159–187.
Peitz, Martin and Florian Schu¨tt (2016). “Net Neutrality and Inflation of Traffic”. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization 46.1, pp. 16–62.
Peyrache, Eloic and Lucia Quesada (2011). “Intermediaries, credibility and incentives to
collude”. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 20.4, pp. 1099–1133.
Rutt, James (2011). “Aggregators and the News Industry: Charging for Access to Content”.
Working Paper.
Strausz, Roland (2005). “Honest certification and the threat of capture”. International
Journal of Industrial Organization 23.1, pp. 45–62.
33
Sunstein, Cass and Richard Thaler (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth and Happiness. Yale University Press.
Teh, Tat-How and Julian Wright (2018). “Steering by information intermediaries”. Working
Paper.
Whinston, Michael D. (1990). “Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion”. American Economic
Review 80, pp. 837–860.
34
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds slightly differently in the one- and two-dimensional
cases. Begin with the case where sellers choose both u and r. Recall that we define
Πi(ui, uj, b) ≡ pii (rˆi(ui, uj, b), ui, uj, b). In order to prove the results, we totally differenti-
ate the first-order condition
∂Πi(ui, uj, b)
∂ui
= 0.
We thus obtain
dui
db
|duj=0 = −
∂2Πi
∂ui∂b
∂2Πi
∂u2i
. (15)
By the second-order condition the denominator is negative. By the envelope theorem, we
have ∂Πi
∂ui
= ∂pii
∂ui
, so that
∂2Πi
∂ui∂b
=
∂rˆi
∂b
∂2pii
∂ui∂ri
(we are also using the fact that ∂
2pii
∂ui∂b
= ∂
2Di
∂ui∂b
= 0 in the Hotelling model with additive bias,
see the discussion in section 3).
The term ∂
2pii
∂ui∂ri
is positive under congruence, and negative under conflict. The direction
of the shift in firm i’s best-response thus depends on the sign of ∂rˆi
∂b
.
Using the implicit function theorem over (4), we get
∂rˆ1
∂b
=
∂D1
∂b
∂2C
∂r21
> 0 and
∂rˆ2
∂b
=
∂D2
∂b
∂2C
∂r22
< 0. (16)
Parts (i) and (ii) directly follow. For part (iii), we use a similar reasoning for dui
duj
|db=0,
using the fact that
∂rˆi
∂uj
=
∂Di
∂uj
∂2C
∂r2i
< 0. (17)
In the one-dimensional case where ri = r(ui), we have
∂Πi
∂ui
= r′(ui)
∂pii
∂ri
+
∂pii
∂ui
= r′(ui)Di +
∂pii
∂ui
.
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Using the property that ∂
2pii
∂ui∂b
= 0, we find that ∂
2Πi
∂ui∂b
is of the same sign as ∂Di
∂b
under
congruence, and of the opposite sign under conflict, thereby proving parts (i) and (ii). A
similar reasoning gives the slope of the best-response function (part (iii)).
Proof of Proposition 1 (two-dimension case). We start by proving the result for
the case where sellers choose both u and r. The proof for the one-dimensional case where
sellers choose (only) u follows the same steps and is included below. Let u∗1(b) and u
∗
2(b)
be the equilibrium utility levels when bias is b. The first-order condition for seller i is
∂Πi(u
∗
1(b), u
∗
2(b), b)
∂ui
= 0.
By the implicit function theorem, we therefore have, for i = 1, 2:
∂2Πi(u
∗
1(b), u
∗
2(b), b)
∂u2i
u∗
′
i (b) +
∂2Πi(u
∗
1(b), u
∗
2(b), b)
∂ui∂uj
u∗
′
j (b) +
∂2Πi(u
∗
1(b), u
∗
2(b), b)
∂ui∂b
= 0.
Solving this two-equation system gives
u∗
′
i (b) =
∂2Πi
∂ui∂b
∂2Πj
∂u2j
− ∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
∂2Πj
∂uj∂b
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
∂2Πj
∂uj∂ui
− ∂2Πi
∂u2i
∂2Πj
∂u2j
. (18)
Out task is to sign this expression.
Preliminaries: Using similar steps as in the proof of Lemma 1, we have
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
=
∂rˆi
∂uj
∂2pii
∂ui∂ri
=
∂rˆi
∂uj
(
∂Di
∂ui
− ∂
2C
∂ui∂ri
)
. (19)
We have already shown that ∂rˆi
∂uj
< 0 (proof of Lemma 1) and we know that ∂
2pii
∂ui∂ri
is, by
definition, positive under congruence and negative under conflict.
Similarly, we have
∂2Πi
∂ui∂b
=
∂rˆi
∂b
∂2pii
∂ui∂ri
=
∂rˆi
∂b
(
∂Di
∂ui
− ∂
2C
∂ui∂ri
)
, (20)
where ∂rˆi
∂b
is positive for i = 1 and negative for i = 2.
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Using the implicit-function theorem on seller i’s first-order condition, ∂Πi
∂ui
= 0, we have
uˆ′i(uj) = −
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
∂2Πi
∂u2i
. (21)
Denominator: Equation 21 implies that the denominator of (18) can be rewritten as
∂2Πi
∂u2i
∂2Πj
∂u2j
(uˆ′i(u
∗
j)uˆ
′
j(u
∗
i )− 1). By the second-order condition, ∂
2Πi
∂u2i
< 0 for both sellers. By
the stability condition (Assumption 1), the term in brackets is negative. Therefore, the
denominator in (18) is negative.
Numerator: Using (19)–(21), the numerator in (18) for i = 1 is equal to
NUM1 =
∂2pi1
∂u1∂r1
{
∂2pi2
∂u2∂r2
}[
∂rˆ1
∂b
(
−
∂rˆ2
∂u1
uˆ′2(u1)
)
− ∂rˆ1
∂u2
∂rˆ2
∂b
]
. (22)
Using expressions (17) and (16), and the fact that ∂Di
∂b
= µ for i = 1 and −µ for i = 2,
the term in square brackets is of the same sign as
(
−
∂D2
∂u1
uˆ′2(u1)
+
∂D1
∂u2
)
=
(
1
2uˆ′2(u1)t
− 1
2t
)
, (23)
which is positive when seller 2’s payoffs are in conflict and negative when they are congruent.
The term in curly brackets in (22) is positive when 2’s payoffs are congruent and negative
when they are conflicting. Because the terms in curly and square brackets have opposite
signs, and because the denominator of (18) is negative, (18) has the same sign as the first
term of (22). This is positive if seller 1’s payoffs are congruent and negative otherwise.
The proof for seller 2 is identical except that the analog of (23) has the opposite sign.
Proof of Proposition 1 (one-dimension case). We now prove Proposition 1 for the
uni-dimensional case where sellers choose only u. The proof follows similar steps to the
two-dimension case. Using ∂
2Πi
∂ui∂uj
= ∂ri
∂ui
∂Di
∂uj
, ∂
2Πi
∂ui∂b
= ∂ri
∂ui
∂Di
∂b
, and uˆ′i(uj) = − ∂
2Πi
∂ui∂uj
/∂
2Πi
∂u2i
, we
can write the numerator of (18) for seller 1 as
NUM1 = − ∂r1
∂u1
∂r2
∂u2
(
∂D1
∂b
∂D2
∂u2
1
uˆ′2(u1)
+
∂D1
∂u2
∂D2
∂b
)
.
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Substitute ∂D1
∂b
∂D2
∂u2
= −∂D2
∂b
∂D1
∂u2
= −µ/2t to yield
NUM1 =
∂r1
∂u1
∂r2
∂u2
(
1
uˆ′2(u1)
− 1
)
µ
2t
.
When 2’s payoffs are congruent we have ∂r2
∂u2
> 0 > uˆ′2(u1) > −1. Given that the
denominator of (18) is negative, (18) must therefore have the same sign as ∂r1
∂u1
: positive
when seller 1’s payoffs are congruent and negative when they are conflicting.
When 2’s payoffs are conflicting, ∂r2
∂u2
< 0 and
(
1
uˆ′2(u1)
− 1
)
> 0, so that, again, the sign
of u∗′1 (b) is positive if 1’s payoffs are congruent and negative otherwise.
We can apply a symmetric reasoning for seller 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1: two-dimensional case. Sellers’ profits can be written
as
pi1 = r1
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(u1 − u2) + µb
]
− C
2
(u1 + r1 − v)2, (24)
pi2 = r2
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(u2 − u1)− µb
]
− C
2
(u2 + r2 − v)2. (25)
Computing the first-order condition ∂pii/∂ri = 0 yields (6). The condition for congruence
is
∂rˆi(ui,uj)
∂ui
> 0, i.e. Ct < 1/2.
Substituting these rˆis into the profit functions and differentiating pii with respect to ui
yields a system of best responses that is solved to give the equilibrium utility offers: (8).
The consumer indifferent between 1 and 2 is interior if
1
2
+
1
2t
(u1 − u2) + b ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ b < 1− 3Ct
4Cµt− 6Ct− 2µ+ 2 . (26)
Part 2: one-dimensional case. when the sellers’ choice is one-dimensional, profits are
pi1 = (v − ψu1)
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(u1 − u2) + µb
]
− C
2
u21
pi2 = (v − ψu2)
[
1
2
+
1
2t
(u2 − u1)− µb
]
− C
2
u22.
Computing ∂pii/∂ui = 0 and simultaneously solving this system of first-order conditions
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yields (9).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consumer surplus: Consumer surplus is given by (10). In
the two-dimensional case (evaluated at (8)), this gives
CS|u∗1,u∗2 = v +
b2µ2t(1− 2Ct)2
(1− 3Ct)2 − b
2µt+
2− 5Ct
4C
. (27)
Differentiating,
∂CS|u∗1,u∗2
∂b
= 2bµt
(
µ(1− 2Ct)2
(1− 3Ct)2 − 1
)
, (28)
which is positive if and only if
Ct <
3− 2µ+√µ
9− 4µ ≡ Ct. (29)
Because Ct ≤ 1/2, this condition can only be satisfied under congruence.
In the one-dimensional case, substituting u∗1 and u
∗
2 from (9) into (10) yields
CS|u∗1,u∗2 =
1
36
(
36 (2Ct2 + v)
2Ct+ ψ
+
64b2C2t3µ2
(2Ct+ 3ψ)2
− 64b
2Ct2µ2
2Ct+ 3ψ
− t (45 + 4b2µ(9− 4µ))) .
The derivative with respect to b is
∂CS|u∗1,u∗2
∂b
= −2btµ (4C
2t2 + 12Ctψ + (9− 4µ)ψ2)
(2Ct+ 3ψ)2
, (30)
which is negative when ψ > 0. It is positive if ψ < 0 and
Ct < Ct ≡ −3ψ − 2
√
µψ
2t
.
Welfare: Start with the two-dimensional case. Consumer surplus is given by (27).
Sellers’ profits are found by substitution of (u∗1, u
∗
2, r
∗
1, r
∗
2) into (24) and (25). Total welfare
is then evaluated as
W = CS + pi1 + pi2 =
1
4C
− t
4
+ v − b2tµ+ b
2t(1 + Ct(−5 + 8Ct))µ2
(1− 3Ct)2 .
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The derivative with respect to b is positive if
∂W |u∗1,u∗2
∂b
= 2btµ
(
(1 + Ct(8Ct− 5))µ
(1− 3Ct)2 − 1
)
> 0,
i.e., if
Ct < C˜t ≡ 6− 5µ+
√
µ(8− 7µ)
18− 16µ .
It is easily checked that ∂W/∂b is greater than ∂CS/∂b (given in (28)).
For the one-dimensional case, we proceed in a similar fashion, taking the expressions
for CS, u∗1, and u
∗
2 from (9). We have
∂W |u∗1,u∗2
∂b
=
2btµ [4Ctψ(µψ − 3) + ψ2(4µ(1 + ψ)− 9)− 4C2t2]
(2Ct+ 3ψ)2
,
which is positive if
Ct < C˜t ≡ 1
2
(
µψ2 +
√
4µψ2 − 2µψ3 + µ2ψ4 − 3ψ
)
.
Again, ∂W/∂b > ∂CS/∂b, where the latter derivative is given in (30).
Industry profit: We have pii(ui, uj, ri, b) = riDi(ui, uj, b)−C(ui, ri). By the envelope
theorem we have
dpii
db
=
∂pii
∂uj
∂uj
∂b
+ ri
∂Di
∂b
Using the fact that D1 +D2 = 1, and that
∂Di
∂uj
=
∂Dj
∂ui
, the effect of b on industry profit is
d(pi1 + pi2)
db
= (r1 − r2)∂D1
∂b
+
(
r1
∂u2
∂b
+ r2
∂u1
∂b
)
∂D1
∂u2
In the 2 dimension model we can further simplify this to
d(pi1 + pi2)
db
= (r1 − r2)
(
µ− (1− 2Ct)2Ctµ
4Ct(1− 3Ct)
)
= (r1 − r2) µ
2(3Ct− 1)(4Ct− 1)
We always have r1 ≥ r2 in equilibrium, and Ct > 1/3 by the stability condition. Thus
industry profit increases in b.
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In the one-dimensional model, the condition is d(pi1+pi2)
db
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ Ct+ ψ ≥ 0, which is
true (because Ct ≥ max{−3ψ
2
, 0} by the stability condition).
Proof of Corollary 1. Profits are
pi1(r1, u1, u2, b) = r1
[
(1− µ)
(
1
2
+
u1 − u2
2t
)
+ µ
]
− C(u1, r1) (31)
= (1− µ)
[
r1
(
1
2
+
u1 − u2
2t
+ b˜
)
− C˜(u1, r1)
]
, (32)
pi2(r1, u1, u2, b) = r2(1− µ)
[
1
2
+
u2 − u1
2t
]
− C(u2, r2) (33)
= (1− µ)
[
r2
(
1
2
+
u2 − u1
2t
)
− C˜(u2, r2)
]
. (34)
where b˜ ≡ µ
1−µ and C˜(u, r) ≡ C(u,r)1−µ . Notice that the profit of seller 1 in (32) is of the same
form as in the interior equilibrium. Therefore the best-response function shares the same
properties: it is decreasing in u2 under congruence and increasing under conflict. Moreover,
an increase in b˜ shifts seller 1’s best-response upwards under congruence, and downwards
under conflict. A similar reasoning for seller 2 reveals that the best-response function is
decreasing under congruence and increasing under conflict. If b˜ was equal to zero, the two
best-response functions would intersect on the 45◦ line (with u1 on the horizontal axis and
u2 on the vertical axis). With b˜ > 0, the equilibrium is therefore below the 45
◦ line under
congruence, and above it under conflict.
A.2 Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4 (Neutrality). Computing, from (11), the first-order condition
∂pii/∂ri = 0 yields rˆi(ui, uj):
rˆi(ui, uj) = v − ui +
t+ (1− µ)(ui − u∗j)
2Ct
.
Substituting rˆi(ui, uj) into pii(ri, ui, uj) to get Πi(ui, uj) and finding the symmetric
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solution to ∂Πi/∂ui = 0 yields equilibrium us:
u∗i =
1
2C
+ v − t
1− µ. (35)
Consumer surplus is
CS = (1− µ)
{∫ D1(u1,u2,0)
0
[u1 − tx] dx+
∫ 1
D1(u1,u2,0)
[u2 − t(1− x)] dx
}
+
µ
{∫ 1/2
0
[u1 − tx] dx+
∫ 1
1/2
[u2 − t(1− x)] dx
}
, (36)
which evaluates to
CS|u∗1,u∗2 =
1
2C
−
(
1
1− µ +
1
4
)
t+ v.
Comparing this to the surplus from the baseline model (given in (27)) yields part 3.
Part 1 of the result follows immediately because sellers’ utility offers are symmetric
and sending consumers with x < 1/2 to seller 1 therefore yields the optimal match.
To see part 2, we compute the weighted average utility offer in the baseline model as
u∗1D1(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, b) + u
∗
2D2(u
∗
1, u
∗
2, b) =
1
2C
− t+ v − 2b
2t(1− 2Ct)µ
1− 3Ct +
2b2t(1− 2Ct)2µ2
(1− 3Ct)2 .
Subtracting (35) from this yields
tµ
(
1
1− µ −
2b2(1− 2Ct)(1− µ− Ct(3− 2µ))
(1− 3Ct)2
)
.
This difference is positive whenever (26) is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under congruence we have
dΠ1
db
=
∂Π1
∂r1
dr1
db
+
∂Π1
∂u1
du1
db
+
∂Π1
∂u2
du2
db
+
∂Π1
∂b
.
The first two terms are zero by the envelope theorem. The last two terms can be rewritten
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as
r1
(
µ− du2
db
1
2t
)
> 0.
For conflict, we have
dΠ1
db
=
∂r1
∂b
(
D1 − ∂C(u1, r1)
∂r1
)
+ r
dD1
db
− du1
db
∂C(u1, r1)
∂u1
.
The first term is zero by the envelope theorem and we know that du1/db < 0 under conflict
(Proposition 1). It remains to show that dD1/db > 0. From (18), and using the observation
(from the proof of Proposition 1) that uˆ′i(uj) = −
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
∂2Πi
∂u2
i
, we have
u∗′1 (b)− u∗′2 (b) =
[1− uˆ′2(u∗1)]
∂2Π1
∂u1∂b
∂2Π1
∂u21
− [1− uˆ′1(u∗2)]
∂2Π2
∂u2∂b
∂2Π2
∂u22
uˆ′1(u
∗
2)uˆ
′
2(u
∗
1)− 1
. (37)
From (17), (16), (19), and (20):
∂2Π1
∂u1∂b
∂2Π1
∂u21
= −2tµ
∂2Π1
∂u1∂u2
∂2Π1
∂u21
= −2tµuˆ′1(u2),
∂2Π2
∂u2∂b
∂2Π2
∂u22
= 2tµ
∂2Π2
∂u1∂u2
∂2Π2
∂u22
= 2tµuˆ′2(u1)
Substituting this into (37) yields
u∗′1 (b)− u∗′2 (b) = −2tµ
[1− uˆ′2(u∗1)] uˆ′1(u∗2) + [1− uˆ′1(u∗2)] uˆ′2(u∗1)
uˆ′1(u
∗
2)uˆ
′
2(u
∗
1)− 1
.
Starting from (2), we have
dD1
db
= µ+
1
2t
[u∗′1 (b)− u∗′2 (b)] = µ
1 + uˆ′1(u
∗
2) + uˆ
′
2(u
∗
1)− 3uˆ′1(u∗2)uˆ′2(u∗1)
1− uˆ′1(u∗2)uˆ′2(u∗1)
.
Because there is conflict, and using Assumption 1, 0 < uˆ′i(u
∗
j) < 1. Thus,
dD1
db
> 0,
completing the proof that the integrated seller’s profit is increasing in b.
Proof of Lemma 3. Given the payoff structure, it is slightly more convenient to work
with r as the main choice variable. That is, for given values of ri, rj and uj, we first find
the optimal ui, denoted uˆi. It turns out that uˆi only depends on ri, and does not depend
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on whether a seller expects to win or lose the contest: uˆ(ri) = v + ri(
1
2Ct
− 1). Notice that
the condition for payoffs to be congruent or conflicting is the same as under integration.
Suppose that sellers play a symmetric strategy profile (r, uˆ(r)). The right-hand
derivative of the profit is t−r
2t
+ µb(1 − 2α). The left-hand derivative of the profit is
t−r
2t
− µb, which is always smaller than the right-hand derivative. Therefore we cannot
have a symmetric equilibrium.
In an asymmetric equilibrium, one seller (say 1) maximizes (13) and the other maximizes
(14). The solution is
r1 = t+
2bt(α + Ct(1− 4α)
3Ct− 1 and r2 = t+
2bt(α− Ct(1 + 2α)
3Ct− 1 (38)
Proof of Proposition 6 (Divestiture). Consumer surplus is given by (10). Using (38),
this is equal to
CS|u∗1,u∗2 =
1
2C
− 5t
4
+ v − b(Ct(b− 2α) + α)µ
C
+
b2t(1− 2Ct)2(1− α)2µ2
(1− 3Ct)2 .
This is less than (27) under congruence (Ct < 1/2). It is greater than (27) under conflict
whenever b ≤ 1−3Ct
2(1−3Ct−(1−2Ct)(1−α)µ) (which is the condition for demand to be interior).
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B Alternative model specifications
B.1 Model with multiplicative bias
Here we consider an alternative specification for the effect of bias on demand. In our baseline
specification, bias steers b consumers who are close to indifferent towards seller 1. Here, we
instead take bias as directing a random and uniformly chosen sample of b consumers towards
the integrated seller. In particular, we take demands to be D1 =
1
2t
(u1 − u2)(1− b) + b,
whereas D2 =
1
2t
(u2 − u1)(1 − b). To be concise, we take µ = 1 and focus on the
mutli-dimensional case where sellers choose both u and r.
We have the following result:
Proposition 7. When D1 = x
∗(1− b) + b and D2 = (1− x∗)(1− b):
1. If both sellers’ payoffs are congruent then u∗1 − u∗2 is positive and increases with b.
2. If both sellers’ payoffs are conflicting then u∗1 − u∗2 is negative and decreases with b.
Proof. Preliminaries: The first-order condition for firm i ,
∂Πi(ui,uj ,b)
∂ui
= 0, can be written
as follows:
rˆi(ui, uj, b)
∂Di(ui, uj, b)
∂ui
+
∂rˆi(ui, uj, b)
∂ui
Di(ui, uj, b)
− ∂rˆi(ui, uj, b)
∂ui
∂C(ui, rˆi(ui, uj, b))
∂ri
− ∂C(ui, rˆi(ui, uj, b))
∂ui
= 0. (39)
Plugging (4) into (39), and dropping the arguments, we find that the best-reply uˆi(uj, b)
is implicitly given by
rˆi
∂Di
∂ui
− ∂C
∂ui
= 0. (40)
Totally differentiating (40) yields
∂2Πi
∂u2i
dui +
[
∂Di
∂ui
− ∂
2C
∂ui∂ri
](
∂rˆi
∂uj
duj +
∂rˆi
∂b
db
)
+ rˆi
∂2Di
∂uj∂b
db = 0,
which is the same as in the additive bias case except for the new final term. This implies
that, as in the additive bias case, we have strategic complements under conflict and strategic
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substitutes under congruence. Expressions (17), (16), (19), and (20) are unchanged, as is
the condition that uˆ′i(uj) = −
∂2Πi
∂ui∂uj
∂2Πi
∂u2
i
from Proposition 1.
Main proof: Following the analysis in the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 caries
us again to (37). Using (17) and (16) we can write
∂rˆ1
∂b
=
∂rˆ1
∂u2
∂D1
∂b
∂D1
∂u2
= − ∂rˆ1
∂u2
2t
1− b(1− x
∗).
By (19) and (20), we can therefore replace the ∂
2Π1
∂u1∂b
/
∂2Π1
∂u21
term in (37) with
∂2Π1
∂u1∂b
∂2Π1
∂u21
= −
∂2Π1
∂u1∂u2
∂2Π1
∂u21
2t
1− b(1− x
∗) = − 2t
1− b(1− x
∗)uˆ′1(u2). (41)
By the same token, we can rewrite ∂
2Π2
∂u2∂b
/
∂2Π2
∂u22
as
∂2Π2
∂u2∂b
∂2Π2
∂u22
= −
∂2Π1
∂u1∂u2
∂2Π1
∂u21
∂D2
∂b
∂D2
∂u1
=
2t
1− bx
∗uˆ′2(u1). (42)
Substituting (41) and (42) into (37) yields
u∗′1 (b)− u∗′2 (b) = −
2t
1− b
[1− uˆ′2(u∗1)] (1− x∗)uˆ′1(u∗2) + [1− uˆ′1(u∗2)]x∗uˆ′2(u∗1)
1− uˆ′1(u∗2)uˆ′2(u∗1)
.
Given Assumption 1, this is positive if uˆ′1(u
∗
2) < 0 and uˆ
′
2(u
∗
1) < 0, which we know to be
true under congruence. it is negative if uˆ′1(u
∗
2) > 0 and uˆ
′
2(u
∗
1) > 0, which holds under
conflict.
B.2 Other Discrete Choice Models
The results above have been obtained in a Hotelling model where the demand for seller 1
is D1 =
1
2t
(u1 − u2) + b.39 But our main observation about the importance of congruence
and conflict is robust to other common discrete choice demand specifications.
Suppose that consumer l obtains utility ui + il from seller i’s product, where il is
39Here, we focus on µ = 1 for brevity.
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an i.i.d. taste shock.40 We consider two cases. In the first case, the shock is normally
distributed, yielding demand for seller 1 of
D1 = Φ
(
u1 − u2√
2
)
+ b,
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. The second case is the logit
demand model (where the shocks follow a type-I extreme value distribution). Demand is
then
D1 =
eu1
eu1 + eu2
+ b.
In either case, seller 2’s demand is 1−D1.
To allow us to compute the equilibrium, we focus on the one-dimensional case where
sellers choose ui, resulting in per-consumer revenue r(ui) = 1− ψui and cost C(ui) = u2i .
Given this model setup, profits are as in (1), and the equilibrium is found where ∂pi1
∂u1
=
∂pi2
∂u2
= 0. Solving for and plotting the equilibrium values of u∗1 and u
∗
2 yields Figure 6.
The key parameter of interest is ψ: payoffs are congruent when ψ < 0 and conflicting
when ψ > 0. Thus, according to Proposition 1, we would expect that u1 increases with b
when ψ < 0 and decreases with b when ψ > 0. Conversely, we would expect u2 to decrease
with b when ψ < 0 and increase with b when ψ > 0. This is indeed what we observe for
both the logit and probit cases.41
B.3 Discrete choice specifications with multiplicative bias
We can repeat the analysis from the previous subsection for the case with multiplicative
bias. Thus, sellers’ demands are
D1 = Φ
(
u1 − u2√
2
)
(1− b) + b, D2 = Φ
(
u2 − u1√
2
)
(1− b),
40In our baseline Hotelling model, 2l = −t− 1l, with 1l uniformly distributed on [−t, 0].
41We have computed the equilibrium for every combination of b ∈ {0, 1100 , 2100 , 3100 , . . . , 1} and ψ ∈{−1,− 4950 ,− 4850 , . . . , 4950 , 1} and verified that u1 is increasing (and u2 decreasing) in b if ψ < 0. This is
reversed if ψ > 0.
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in the case of normally distributed preference shocks and
D1 =
eu1
eu1 + eu2
(1− b) + b, D1 = e
u2
eu1 + eu2
(1− b)
for the logit case. As above, we take r(ui) = 1−ψui and C(ui) = u2i . In light of Proposition
7, it makes sense to consider the effect of bias on u∗1 − u∗2 and we would expect to see this
increase under congruence and decrease under conflict. This is indeed the case. A plot
can be found in Figure 7.
B.4 Non-uniform consumer locations in the Hotelling model
Lastly, we repeat the analysis by returning to the baseline Hotelling specification, but
assuming that, for any x ∈ (0, 1), there are Φ˜(x) consumers located to the left of x and
1 − Φ˜(x) located to the right, where Φ˜(·) is the CDF of the normal distribution with
mean 1/2 and variance 1.42 Thus, firm 1’s demand is Φ˜(x∗ + b) and firm 2’s demand is
1− Φ˜(x∗ + b).
As above, we take r(ui) = 1 − ψui and C(ui) = u2i . Bias is no longer additively
separable in firms’ demand and, similarly to Proposition 7, we therefore focus on the effect
of bias on u∗1 − u∗2. We would expect to see u∗1 − u∗2 increase in b under congruence and
decrease under conflict. This is indeed the case. A plot can be found in Figure 8.
42For convenience, we truncate the distribution by locating the residual mass of consumers at x ∈ {0, 1}
rather than distributing them along the [0, 1] interval.
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x∗ x∗ + b0 1
Sent to seller 1 Sent to seller 2Wrongly sent
to seller 1 (bias)
location of indifferent consumer
Figure 1: Allocation of uninformed consumers
uˆ1(u2)
uˆ2(u1)
∆
b
>
0
u1
u
2
Figure 2: Congruent payoffs: u1 increases in b, u2 decreases.
uˆ1(u2)
uˆ2(u1)
∆b >
0
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Figure 3: Conflicting payoffs: u1 decreases in b, u2 increases.
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Figure 4: Welfare effects of bias
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Figure 5: The effect of divestiture.
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Figure 6: The effect of an increase in b on u∗1 and u
∗
2. Figures (a) and (b) show the case for
normally distributed shocks, while (c) and (d) show the type-I extreme value distribution
(logit) case.
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Figure 7: The effect of an increase in b on u∗1− u∗2. Figures (a) shows the case for normally
distributed shocks, while (b) treats the logit case.
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Figure 8: The effect of an increase in b on u∗1−u∗2 when consumers are distributed according
to a truncated normal distribution on the Hotelling line.
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